Autobiographical memory and the self in a single-case of chronic unilateral spatial neglect by Ernst, Alexandra et al.
Published in: Neurocase : Case Studies in Neuropsychology, Neuropsychiatry & Behavioural Neurology (2016) 
Status: Postprint (author’s version) 
 
Autobiographical memory and the self in a single-case of chronic 
unilateral spatial neglect 
 
Alexandra Ernsta*, Laurène Gourissea*, Grégoire Wauquiezb and Céline Souchayc 
a Laboratoire d'Etude de l'Apprentissage et du Développement, Université de Bourgogne, Dijon, 
France; bPôle Rééducation, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Dijon, Dijon, France; cLaboratoire de 




Unilateral spatial neglect (USN) is mainly defined as a condition affecting perception and the mental 
representation of the environment. However, nothing is known about its impact on the ability to 
mentally represent one's past and on personal identity. We addressed these questions in a case of 
chronic USN, DR, a 59-year-old right-handed woman, who underwent a variety of measures exploring 
the self and autobiographical memory (AM). DR showed preserved self-images and her AM 
performance was only preserved when memories were prompted by her own self-images and not by 
self-unrelated cues. Our findings are discussed in light of the interconnection between the self and 
AM. 
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The ability to remember one's past (i.e., autobiographical memory; AM) is of fundamental importance 
for the experience of enduring as an individual over time but also for social relationships and for 
guiding behaviors (Conway, 2005). Previous research in cognitive neuropsychology highlights the 
relevance of exploring AM in clinical conditions because of its impact on daily life functioning, for 
instance leading to distress in social situations or frustration when not being able to remember (Ernst 
et al., 2014; Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 2009). 
According to the Self-Memory System model (SMS; Conway, 2005), AM and the self share a 
bidirectional relationship. As such, the self has an organizing role in memory and in return, identity 
formation is supported by a set of self-defining memories. Within this theoretical framework, Rathbone, 
Moulin, and Conway (2008) developed the I AM task, which operationalized the self as "self-images" 
(i.e., enduring and important facets of the self, including physical, psychological, or social aspects). 
Using this task, clinical findings support that the study of the self is critical in understanding how 
people cope with their condition and how this impacts on their psychological well-being (Rathbone, 
Holmes, Murphy, & Ellis, 2015). However, while a loss of or a reduction in the accessibility of self-
images has been described in clinical populations as a result of AM impairment (e.g., Addis & Tippett, 
2004; Tanweer, Rathbone, & Souchay, 2010), other studies suggest that in some cases, self-images 
can be maintained by semantic components of AM, despite deficient episodic AM (lllman, Rathbone, 
Kemp, & Moulin, 2011; Rathbone et al., 2009). 
We report here the case of a patient with chronic left unilateral spatial neglect (USN) - a syndrome that 
commonly arises after lesions of the right hemisphere and which is characterized by disturbances in 
the ability to detect, identify and move toward objects or even to have a mental representation of the 
contralesional (left) side of space (Saj, Fuhrman, Vuilleumier, & Boroditsky, 2013). Most patients show 
a rapid recovery of USN but, in rare cases, this syndrome persists and may be regarded as chronic 
(Stone, Patel, Greenwood, & Halligan, 1992). 
While studies on USN generally focus on perception and attention, which are at the forefront of this 
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condition, one could reasonably expect that USN might impinge on AM. Indeed, since USN 
compromises both the perception and the mental representation of the environment, it is likely that the 
mental representations of the past will also be affected, especially since personal memories are 
characterized by their visual content (Conway, 2005). In this vein, Saj et al. (2013) explored whether 
people with left USN would have difficulty representing events that fall to the left on the spatial 
representation of the mental time line, a hypothesis which was supported by their findings. However, 
this study did not focus on patients' personal memories per se but on the recall of past and future 
characteristics from a fictitious person. This led us to explore AM for the first time in USN, and 




DR is a 59-year-old right-handed woman, who was working as an architect until she suffered from a 
hemorrhagic stroke in December 2013. She was under the care of a neurologist at the University 
Hospital of Dijon (France) and neuroimaging showed a right frontoparietal lesion (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. DR's CT scan 15 days after her stroke (January 2014) showing right frontoparietal lesion 
traces (the right is on the left). 
 
 
One month after her stroke, DR underwent a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment. Scores 
obtained by DR compared to normative data for each test are summarized in Table 1. This 
neuropsychological assessment revealed a left USN, a left hemianesthesia and attentional disorders 
(i.e., alertness, as measured by the alertness subtest from the Test of Attentional Performance (TAP 
2.2). Her USN was mainly egocentric, with problems in the ability to detect and to take into 
consideration objects on the left side of space in the visual, auditory, and somesthetic modalities. At 
this stage, the neuropsychological examination also revealed mild impairment in executive function, 
specifically in verbal fluency (i.e., a measure of executive control ability), and DR also had borderline 
score for inhibition. Anterograde memory scores were also at the limit of the normal range but 
language and praxis were preserved. While DR had no particular subjective complaints, her husband 
had noticed occasional forgetting in daily life. After 24 weeks, only her attentional impairment and USN 
persisted, despite a slight improvement. Her USN was thus considered as chronic (note that her last 
follow-up examination conducted in June 2015 - i.e., after the testing in this study was carried out - 
confirmed that her USN was still present). In comparison, there is a relative preservation of her 
general cognitive functioning. The AM assessment described below was carried out 15 weeks after 
DR's stroke. 
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Autobiographical memory: test episodique de la mémoire du passé autobiographique 
(TEMPau) 
To assess AM, DR underwent the TEMPau (Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2000), which consists 
of generating a total of 24 specific memories across five lifetime periods (0-17 years old, 18-30 years 
old, more than 30 years old except the last 5 years, last 5 years except the last 12 months, and the 
last 
12 months) and providing as many details as possible about the memories. For each life period 
(except the last year), participants have to retrieve memories related to four generic cues (e.g., 
relationships, school, work, travel). For the last year period, eight generic cues are used (e.g., last 
summer, last week, etc.) using a chronological approach. While no practice session was conducted, 
examples of specific and non-specific memories were provided to ensure that DR understood this 
distinction. No time limit was set. 
Each memory is rated on a five-point scale (0 = absence of memory or general information to 4 = 
specific and richly detailed memory). DR's scores were compared to the French normative data for this 
test (Piolino, 2008) for the overall AM score. This included all the scores whatever their nature (max. 
4x4 = 16) and also the strictly episodic score (i.e., including only the specific detailed memories, that is 
memories rated as 4 (max. 4x4=16). 
The TEMPau performance is summarized in Table 2. Crawford and Howell's method (1998) was 
applied for all the statistical comparisons. Compared to norms, DR obtained a lower overall AM mean 
score and a lower strictly episodic mean score. For the overall AM score, this impairment seemed 
present for all the life periods, except for the last five years. For the strictly episodic score, of the 24 
memories requested, DR only provided two episodic memories; the remaining were semantic in nature 
and her performance seemed particularly low for the 18-30 and the last five years' periods. Examples 
of memories provided by DR during the TEMPau are available in Supplemental Data. 
 
I AM task 
To explore the relationship between AM and the self, we carried out the I AM task (Rathbone et al., 
2008). In the absence of normative data for this test, DR performance was compared to those of 14 
healthy controls (10 women) matched for age (mean: 65.71; SD: 19.55). This test consists first in 
generating as many self-images as possible that are important in defining current identity (e.g., I am a 
mother, I am shy). Identity statements were scored using the modified coding scale from the twenty 
statements test (TST; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995). Each statement was coded according to 
eight categories (e.g., traits, social identities, physical descriptions, etc.) and this allowed us to 
measure the complexity of identity (i.e., the number of categories sampled in participants' responses). 
Participants have to select the three most important or significant of their self-images and to provide 
for each one, three specific memories and to describe them in as many details as possible. To ensure 
understanding of instructions, examples of self-images and associated memories were provided to all 
participants. 
A similar procedure for the TEMPau was used to score these memories (i.e., a five-point scale going 
from 0 = absence of memory or general information to 4 = specific and richly detailed memory). A 
second rater scored 34% of the memories, showing strong inter-rater reliability (Kendall's correlation 
coefficient: 0.85). 
DR and healthy participants' scores are summarized in Table 2. Using the Crawford and Howell's 
method (1998), we observed that DR provided a similar number of self-images as healthy participants, 
suggesting a preserved ability to define herself (examples of DR's self-images: I am a woman, I am 
hard-working, I am reserved). Qualitatively, all the self-images and associated memories provided by 
DR applied to her before her stroke. In addition, no significant difference was found between DR and 
the control group regarding the complexity of identity or the overall AM score of memories triggered by 
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Table 1. DR's scores at the neuropsychological baseline examination. 
 DR's score Normative dataa 
USN   
Line bisection (BIT; mean deviation from the midpoint, in mm) -3 <±6.5 mm 
Target/distractors research (BIT)   
•   Star cancellation (number of cancelled stars) 20/54 b (left-side neglected) >44 
•   Star ratio 0.00b >0.46 
•   Letter cancellation (E/R; number of cancelled letter) 
 
9/40b (left-side neglected) >32 
Ogden figure (raw score) 3/4b 
(left-side neglected) 
≤0 
ROCF (raw score) 14/36b 
Left-side neglected 
Z = - 4.8 
Catherine Bergego scale (raw score) 17/30b Scores between 11 
and 20: moderate 
USN 
Visual extinction (BEN; number of extinctions) Left extinction 
(three extinctions on four bilateral 
stimulations)b 
Any extinction 
Neglect subtest (TAP 2.2) Left:8/24b (1494 ms) Pc. < 1 
•   Scores (mean RT) Right: 19/24c (597 ms) Pc. 8 
Text reading (presence of start of lines omission) Start of line omission (left-side 
neglected)b 
Any omission at the 
left 
Anterograde memory   
Hopkins verbal learning test, form 1 (number of words)   
•   First recall 5/12c Pc. 5 
•   Second recall 7/12c Pc. [5-16] 
•  Third recall 8/12c Pc. 5 
•   Differed recall 7/12c Pc. [5-16] 
•  Total recall 20/36c Pc. 5 
•   Recognition 
 
12/12 Pc. > 50 
Executive functions and attention   
Digit span (WAIS-IV; scaled scores)   
•   Forward 6 Scaled score: 10 
•   Backward 5 Scaled score: 9 
Verbal fluency (GREFEX; number of words)   
•   Letter 17c > 15 
•   Categorical 20b > 24 
GonoGo (TAP 2.2)   
•   Mean total RT 517 msc Pc. 12 
•   Errors (number) 0 Pc. > 62 
Alertness (TAP 2.2)   
•   Mean RT without alert 605 msb Pc. < 1 
•   Mean RT with alert 840 msb Pc. < 1 
•   Phasic alert index 
 
-0.35b Pc. 1 
Language   
Bachy-Langedock 36 (raw score) 
 
36/36 >35 
Praxis   
Mahieux's battery (raw score)   
•   Expressive gestures 5/5 >4 
•   Use of objects mime 10/10 >8 
•   Meaningless gestures 
 
8/8 >7 
RT: reaction time; BEN: Batterie d'Evaluation de la Négligence; BIT: behavioral inattention test; MEM-III: Wechsler Memory 
Scale-Ill; ROCF: Rey-Osterrieth complex 
figure; SD: standard deviation; TAP 2.2: Test of Attentional Performance 2.2 version.  
aThe normative data are based on the established norms for each test, corresponding to DR's age. Depending on the test, the 
normal range is expressed as a z-score (pathological z-score = -1.65), a percentile (pathological percentile: Pc < 5), or a cut off 
score.  
bScore under the normal range,  
cborderline score but remaining in the normal range. 
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Discussion 
This single-case study explored AM and the self in chronic USN for the first time (to the best of our 
knowledge). While perceptual and attentional abilities are generally the critical domains in this 
condition, our data suggest that an AM deficit could be present in chronic USN, in the context of a 
relative preservation of other cognitive functions, such as language or anterograde memory. Despite 
AM impairment, DR provided without difficulty a series of self-images that define herself, with similar 
qualitative properties as healthy participants. While AM and the self-share a strong relationship at the 
theoretical level (the SMS model; Conway, 2005), our results fit with the growing body of clinical 
research using the I AM task showing that AM impairment does not consistently lead to a loss or an 
impoverishment of the self. For instance, previous studies have documented that the self can be 
supported by semantic aspects of AM when episodic AM is deficient (lllman et al., 2011; Rathbone et 
al., 2009). However, DR's profile of AM results advocated an alternative view, since the memories 
supporting her self-images were not semantic or overgeneralized. 
In particular, an intriguing finding is the different benefit from memory cueing reported in DR, who 
showed preserved AM performance when memories were cued by her own self-images but not when 
memories were prompted by generic/self-unrelated cues. In other words, DR provided memories with 
a similar episodic quality as those from healthy participants when triggered by her self-images. Based 
on the SMS model, we suggest cautiously that DR's results could be related to retrieval mechanisms. 
Specifically, the use of self-images as cues to elicit memories could be less demanding in terms of 
retrieval strategies, with thus an easier access to memories, than with the use of generic cues. In 
support, such a finding could be related to the self-reference effect, which corresponds to the tendency 
for people to better remember information relevant to them (see Klein, 2012 for a review). Recently, 
Kwan, Kurczek, and Rosenbaum (2015) reported similar outcomes in amnesic patients when 
prompted by personal cues derived from previous past events. Kwan and colleagues suggested that 
the benefit from personal cues could be related to the activation of some kind of framework conveyed 
by self-relevant cues, which could then help to structure event details. Regarding the current study, 
and in relation with the SMS model (Conway, 2005), the activation of self-images in the working self 
(i.e., a dynamic system containing goal structures that control, among others, the retrieval of specific 
memories) would have an organizational function in AM. In particular, self-images would activate, 
through the working self, a set of highly accessible memories supporting each self-image (Rathbone et 
al., 2008). In contrast, the use of generic cues would require more effortful processes with a first 
elaboration of the cue, then a further search in memory, then the selection and assessment of the 
retrieved memory. 
From a neuroanatomical standpoint, DR suffered from frontoparietal damage, a brain region involved 
in AM retrieval (Berryhill, Phuong, Picasso, Cabeza, & Olson, 2007; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 
2006). In addition, according to the SMS model, the frontal lobe is particularly involved in effortful 
retrieval, which fits well with DR's impairment when memories were prompted by generic cues that 
require more retrieval strategies. 
Needless to say, alternative hypotheses could also account for DR's AM impairment. This includes the 
presence of attentional disorders (i.e., alertness in this case) or the role of the inferior parietal lobule in 
conscious awareness (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson, & Moscovitch, 2008). However, these two 
alternative suggestions fit less with the differential effect of self-related vs. generic cues on DR's 
performance and further studies are necessary to support our current hypothesis. 
In a previous study, Saj and colleagues (2013) showed that patients with USN have difficulties 
representing past events along a mental time line. As stated earlier, their study did not focus on 
patients' personal memories. While our results support to some extent the impact of USN on the ability 
to form mental representations of the past, an open question is whether Saj et al.'s results would be 
different if people with USN have to represent past events along an individualized mental time line, 
built on personally meaningful temporal labels or milestones (e.g., my wedding, the birth of my child, 
my hospitalization). Also of interest, Saj and colleagues showed that the difficulties in representing 
events along a mental time line are restricted to the past and do not extend to the representation of the 
future. Considering that AM and episodic future thought (i.e., the ability to imagine personal future 
events) share a strong relationship - notwithstanding that episodic future thought requires additional 
cognitive and neural resources (Schacter et al., 2012 for a review), a future direction would be to 
explore if our current findings for the past would be similar for the future. 
From a clinical standpoint, this single-case provides new insights into the cognitive profile of people 
with chronic left USN. Needless to say, further studies are warranted to explore whether this AM 
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profile is observed in other cases of USN (in both transitory and chronic cases) and to disentangle the 
precise relationship between the characteristics of USN and this profile of AM impairment. In 
particular, a critical issue would be to compare memories with matched temporal distance that were 
encoded before or after the occurrence of USN - an issue that we could not discuss in DR's case due 
to the short time frame between her stroke and AM assessment. A limitation of the current study that 
should also be addressed in further studies would be to have patients' self-images checked over by 
their relatives. 
More generally, these findings support the usefulness of AM assessment in clinical practice to reveal 
memory impairment undetected by routine anterograde memory tests, but which could have a 
deleterious impact in daily functioning of patients. These results also reflect the occurrence of subtle 
AM impairment in patients, whose observation might depend on the method of assessment used and, 
more specifically, on the cue-words used to elicit memories. Since the cue-word method is one of the 
most frequently used methods of AM assessment, this suggestion could have implications for future 
clinical research and the development of sensitive diagnostic approach. In addition, we echo the 
recent recommendations by Kwan et al. (2015), who promoted the overall contribution of these kind of 
studies in creating more effective ways to structure questions in a personally meaningful way, to 
interact with people with memory impairment. Whether these findings might be a basis for the 
development of cognitive interventions aiming to support AM represents an avenue for future 
research. 
 
Table 2. Scores obtained by DR and healthy participants at the TEMPau and the I AM task. 
 DR Healthy participants mean (SD) Statistical analysisa 
TEMPau b    
Overall AM score    
° 0-17 years 7 * 13.18 (2.41) t = -2.52, p = 0.02 
° 18-30 years 9** 14.00 (1.87) t = -2.63, p = 0.01 
° more than 30 years old 8* 13.63 (2.38) t = -2.33, p = 0.02 
° the last 5 years 9 13.35 (2.38) t = -1.80, p = 0.08 
° the last year 9** 14.21 (1.73) t = -2.96, p = 0.005 
Total (mean score) 8.4* 13.67 (0.43) t = -12.07, p < 0.001 
Strictly episodic AM score    
° 0-17 years 0 8.71 (5.25) t = -1.63, p = 0.11 
° 18-30 years 0* 10.35 (4.19) t = -2.45, p = 0.02 
° more than 30 years old 4 9.41 (4.39) t = -1.21, p = 0.23 
° the last five years 0* 9.41 (4.39) t = -2.11, p = 0.04 
° the last year 4 10.59 (4.28) t = -1.51, p = 0.13 
Total (mean score) 1.6* 9.69 (0.77) t=-10.35, p < 0.001 
I AM task    
Number of self-images 10 8.14 (3.68) t = 0.49, p = 0.63 
Complexity of identity (number of 
categories used) 
3 3 χ2 = 0, p = 1 
Overall AM score 18 19.43 (5.98) t = -0.23, p = 0.83 
a t-Tests based on the Crawford and Howell's method (1998) for single-case studies. 
b The healthy participants' scores mentioned in this table for the TEMPau correspond to those of the normative database from 
Piolino (2008; n = 34).  
* Significant difference at p = 0.05; ** Significant difference with an adjusted p-value (Bonferroni correction: α/5) of p = 0.01 for 
the t-tests ran on the five life periods. 
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